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THE METAMORPHOSIS OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
Brian Slattery*
Aboriginal title has undergone a significant transformation from the
colonial era to the present day. In colonial times, aboriginal title was
governed by Principles of Recognition based on ancient relations
between the Crown and Indigenous American peoples. With the passage
of time, this historical right has evolved into a generative right, governed
by Principles of Reconciliation. As a generative right, aboriginal title
exists in a dynamic but latent form, which is capable of partial
articulation by the courts but whose full implementation requires
agreement between the Indigenous party and the Crown. The courts have
the power to recognize the core elements of a generative right —
sufficient to provide the foundation for negotiations and to ensure that
the Indigenous party enjoys a significant portion of its rights pending
final agreement. However, the courts are not in a position to give a
detailed and exhaustive account of a generative right in all its facets.
This result can be achieved only by negotiations between the parties.
Le titre autochtone a considérablement évolué depuis l’époque
coloniale. À cette époque, le titre autochtone était régi par les principes
de reconnaissance de la common law sur la base des anciennes relations
entre la Couronne et les peuples autochtones américains. Au fil des ans,
ce droit historique est devenu un droit héréditaire régi par les principes
de réconciliation. En tant que droit héréditaire, le titre autochtone existe
sous une forme dynamique mais latente, que les tribunaux peuvent
formuler partiellement, mais dont la définition valide doit faire l’objet
d’une entente entre la partie autochtone et la Couronne. Les tribunaux
disposent du pouvoir de reconnaître les éléments essentiels d’un droit
héréditaire, suffisant pour constituer la base de négociations et garantir
à la partie autochtone qu’elle bénéficiera d’une grande partie de ses
droits en attendant l’entente finale. Cependant, ils ne sont pas en mesure
de présenter de manière détaillée et complète tous les éléments d’un droit
héréditaire. Ce résultat ne peut être atteint que par des négociations
entre les parties.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I am
grateful to John Borrows, Willy Fournier, Peter Hutchins, Shin Imai, and Kent McNeil
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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1. Introduction
Aboriginal title is a legal riddle wrapped in a constitutional enigma
inside a moral conundrum.1 Although the right has long been recognized
in the courts, its fundamental nature is shrouded in doubt. We still do not
know the answers to two basic questions. First, how should we conceive
of aboriginal title: is it a customary right rooted in Indigenous law, a right
under English common law, or a sui generis right? Second, what
practical consequences does aboriginal title carry today: what concrete
rights does it give to Indigenous peoples, and how do these rights affect
the interests of third parties?
Underlying these questions is another basic issue, which arises from
the need for reconciliation — identified by the courts as the fundamental
objective of the modern law of aboriginal and treaty rights.2 How does
the need for reconciliation affect our conception of aboriginal title? How
does it shape the practical consequences flowing from aboriginal title at
the present day?
The conceptual problem is not a new one. It has deep roots in the
jurisprudence, going back as far as the submissions of counsel in the
classic case of Johnson v. M’Intosh,3 almost two centuries ago.
Nevertheless, for many years a certain conception of aboriginal title has
prevailed in Canadian courts, giving rise to the hope that the main
theoretical issues have been resolved.4 That hope has been shaken with
the recent decision of the Supreme Court in R v. Marshall/R. v. Bernard,5
where the Court seems adrift in a conceptual sea, without benefit of star
or compass.
Compounding the confusion is uncertainty over the practical
consequences of recognizing aboriginal title. The courts are torn between
a desire to right a great historical wrong — the unlawful dispossession of
Indigenous peoples — and deep misgivings about doing so at the
256 [Vol.85
1 To adapt Churchill’s well-known remark.
2 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3
S.C.R. 388 at para. 1 [Mikisew].
3 8 Wheaton 543 (U.S.S.C. 1823) at 562-71 [Johnson]. For discussion of the
arguments of counsel, see B. Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial
Perspectives on Aboriginal Title (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law
Centre, 1983) at 18-24 [Ancestral Lands].
4 See Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313 [Calder]; Guerin v. The
Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 [Guerin]; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3
S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw].
5 [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 [Marshall/Bernard].
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expense of third parties and the larger society. These misgivings silently
permeate the Marshall/Bernard decision and go far to explain its
ambiguities.
In this paper, I try to resolve some of these problems. I review the
three leading conceptions of aboriginal title — as a customary right, a
right under English common law, and a sui generis right — and go on to
suggest that only the sui generis approach does justice to the
complexities of the subject. I then consider the practical implications of
recognizing aboriginal title today and argue that we need to distinguish
between historical rights and generative rights. Considered as an
historical right, aboriginal title is governed by Principles of Recognition,
which are traditional common law rules based on ancient dealings
between the British Crown and Indigenous American peoples.
Considered as a generative right, aboriginal title is governed by
Principles of Reconciliation, which are emergent common law rules that
envisage treaty settlements negotiated with the assistance of the courts.
The paper begins with an exposition of the basic argument as a whole. It
then considers in detail the argument’s two main branches, dealing with
the concept of aboriginal title, and its practical consequences today.
2. The Basic Argument
Aboriginal title has undergone important changes from the time of
contact to the present day. When European adventurers and fishermen
first began visiting North America, the Indigenous peoples of the
continent were independent and sovereign entities, holding title to the
territories they occupied under universal international law.6 The title of
Indigenous peoples to their territories was a function of their sovereignty,
and it entailed both the exclusive right to the territory in question and
exclusive jurisdiction over it. Under international law, this title had a
uniform legal character, assigning the same basic rights to all Indigenous
peoples alike. However, the manner in which sovereign title was
implemented internally, within the group, obviously varied from people
to people in accordance with their local constitutions and laws.
The small European colonies founded on the eastern shores of
America gradually grew in population and influence, and by a complex
2572006]
6 The basic argument is made in B. Slattery, “Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial
Claims” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 681. The term “universal international law” is
used advisedly. We need to distinguish genuinely universal law from certain European
versions of that law that arbitrarily denied the sovereignty and rights of Indigenous
peoples. For a concise historical overview, see S. J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in
International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 9-38.
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series of events spread over several centuries the British Crown (and its
successor the Canadian Crown) emerged as the factual sovereign of the
territories that now make up Canada. As a result, the international title of
Indigenous groups to their territories was transformed into a form of
domestic title known variously as native title, Indian title, and aboriginal
title.7 This title has both a proprietary and a jurisdictional aspect in
Canadian law. Here I will focus exclusively on its character as a land
right.
Aboriginal title was the creature of a distinctive body of common
law that was generated by the policies and practices of the British Crown
in its intensive relations with Indigenous American nations during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Aboriginal title was not a right
known to English common law or any Indigenous system of law; it
flowed from the distinctive set of rules that bridged the gap between
English and Indigenous legal systems and provided for their interaction.
This body of law passed into British colonial law – the largely common
law system that governed the Crown’s relations with its overseas
colonies and furnished their basic constitutional frameworks.8 In this
manner it came to operate in all the nascent British colonies in America,
and subsequently in Australia, New Zealand and other British
possessions. This distinctive or sui generis body of law is known as the
common law of aboriginal rights.9
258 [Vol.85
7 This is not to say, of course, that Indigenous peoples do not also have certain
rights under international law today; see generally Anaya, ibid., c. 2-6.
8 Classic works dealing with colonial law include G. Chalmers, Opinions of
Eminent Lawyers on Various Points of English Jurisprudence (London: Reed and
Hunter, 1814); C. Clark, A Summary of Colonial Law (London: Sweet, Maxwell, and
Stevens and Sons, 1834); W. Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law
(London: Stevens and Haynes, 1869); K. Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial
Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1966); D. P. O’Connell & A. Riordan, Opinions on
Imperial Constitutional Law (Melbourne: Law Book Comp. Ltd., 1971).
9 For a detailed account of this argument, see B. Slattery, “Making Sense of
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196 at 198-206 [“Making
Sense”], which draws in turn on Slattery, Ancestral Lands,  supra note 3 at 35-36, and
B. Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 736-41.
For judicial consideration of the argument, see esp. R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 at
para. 49 [Côté]. For parallel approaches, see M. D. Walters, “British Imperial
Constitutional Law and Aboriginal Rights: A Comment on Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia” (1992) 17 Queen’s L.J. 350; J. Webber, “Relations of Force and Relations
of Justice: The Emergence of Normative Community between Colonists and Aboriginal
Peoples” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 623; J. Borrows, “With or Without You: First
Nations Law (in Canada)” (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 629; J. Borrows & L. I. Rotman, “The 
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The term “common law” is used here in its general sense, to indicate
a body of law developed by custom and usage and articulated in judicial
decisions, rather than to designate the common law of England, which
traditionally had no conception of aboriginal rights. As part of British
colonial law, the common law of aboriginal rights was introduced
automatically into British colonies upon their acquisition, irrespective
whether their general legal systems were based on Indigenous law,
English law, French law, Roman-Dutch law, or some other system.
The common law of aboriginal title recognized the exclusive title of
an Indigenous group to the lands it traditionally occupied and controlled.
There was no need for Indigenous occupation to conform to the
requirements of English property law. In particular, rotating or seasonal
use of territories for hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering was
accepted as a sufficient basis for aboriginal title. An Indigenous group
was entitled to use its lands for whatever purposes it saw fit. It was not
restricted to traditional uses but could adapt its practices to suit the new
opportunities and needs occasioned by expanding horizons and societal
changes. Aboriginal title was viewed at common law as co-existing with
the ultimate or underlying title of the Crown. It could not be transferred
to private parties but could only be ceded to or shared with the Crown by
treaty.
This, then, was the original form of aboriginal title, as it existed in
the period following the Crown’s acquisition of factual sovereignty. Let
us call this historical title, and the common law rules that governed it
Principles of Recognition. However, since the time of Crown
sovereignty, vast changes have occurred in the position of Indigenous
peoples and the larger societies they form part of. Historical aboriginal
title has not remained untouched by this upheaval. It too has undergone
a metamorphosis, becoming what may be termed a generative right
governed by Principles of Reconciliation. This sea change has come
about through a transformation in the common law rules governing the
subject — the common law being a supple instrument that adapts to and
accommodates societal changes. It appears that the process has not been
confined to Canada but has also occurred in other former British
possessions with Indigenous populations.
2592006]
Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does It Make a Difference?” (1997) 36 Alta. 
L. Rev. 9; M. D. Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at
Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 711. For a
thoughtful theoretical treatment of aboriginal title, see P. Macklem, Indigenous
Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2001) at 76-106.
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In Canada the change has been enshrined in section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, which provides that the existing aboriginal and
treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada “are hereby recognized
and affirmed.”10 I suggest that the word “recognized” has particular
application to historical aboriginal rights, as governed by Principles of
Recognition, while the word “affirmed” refers to their articulation as
generative rights in modern times, under Principles of Reconciliation.
The nature of historical aboriginal title is illustrated by the Royal
Proclamation of 1763,11 which mirrors the common law of the period.
The Proclamation was issued by the British Crown shortly after the
cession of New France, which as claimed by the French Crown was an
immense territory extending from the Gulf of St. Lawrence indefinitely
westward toward the Pacific Ocean.12 The Proclamation addressed a
situation in which there were broad factual lines of division between
settler communities and Indigenous peoples. The division was both
territorial and political. British and French settlements were still
relatively small and localized, concentrated along the eastern seaboard
and riverbanks. The colonies were governed by their own systems of law
and government, based on models imported from the mother countries.
Although much of the vast hinterland was claimed by the British Crown,
building on the pretensions of its French predecessor, in reality the
interior was still largely occupied and controlled by independent
Indigenous groups, living under their own laws and systems of
government.
Addressing this situation, the Proclamation of 1763 recognized that
Indian nations living under the Crown’s asserted protection had the
exclusive right to any territories they possessed that had not been ceded
to the Crown. The Proclamation envisaged that, when the English
colonies needed further lands for settlement, the Crown’s representative
260 [Vol.85
10 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [Constitution Act, 1982].
11 Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763, in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British
Royal Proclamations Relating to America (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian
Society, 1911), 212 [Proclamation]. For a detailed discussion of the Proclamation’s
scope and effects, see B. Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, As
Affected by the Crown’s Acquisition of Their Territories (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford
University, 1979; reprint, Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre,
1979) at 191-349 [Land Rights].
12 For discussion of French and English territorial claims, see Slattery, ibid. at 70-
125, 175-90; K. McNeil, Native Claims in Rupert’s Land and the North-Western
Territory: Canada’s Constitutional Obligations (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1982).
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would call an assembly of the Indian nation concerned and attempt to
negotiate a land cession at an agreed price. In the absence of such a
cession, the Proclamation prohibited colonial governments from
granting or settling Indian lands and ordered the removal of any settlers
who planted themselves on such lands. Private purchases of Indian lands
were outlawed and Crown purchases were recognized as the only mode
by which Indian lands could be made available for public use and
disposition.
The Proclamation’s provisions reflect the common law principles
that had crystallized after a century and half of dealings between
Indigenous American peoples and the British Crown. Taken as a whole,
these principles were reasonably well-adapted to the circumstances of
eighteenth-century America. However, as time passed, they became
increasingly inadequate to deal with the changed situation of Indigenous
peoples and consequently underwent a significant transformation.
This change was precipitated by a number of factors. Most important
by far was the fact that in some areas, such as in most of British
Columbia, the local governments failed to negotiate valid treaties for the
cession or sharing of Indigenous lands.13 As the Crown gradually
extended its effective rule, some colonial authorities started treating
Indigenous homelands as if they were available for public use or
disposition to private parties. Aboriginal title was ignored or actively
suppressed. Aboriginal lands were granted away to private individuals
without Indigenous consent, and Indigenous groups found themselves
confined to small tracts of land known as “reserves.”
The dispossession of Indigenous peoples was contrary to the
common law and did not extinguish aboriginal title, in the absence of
clear and plain legislation to that effect. However, the scope and practical
effects of dispossession were so significant that as time passed the
situation became increasingly difficult to reverse without severely
affecting the interests of innocent third parties and the public at large. In
the end, the remedy originally envisaged at common law — the
2612006]
13 For accounts of this process in British Columbia, see R. Fisher, Contact and
Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890 (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 1977); D. C. Harris, Fish, Law, and Colonialism:
The Legal Capture of Salmon in British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2001); C. Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves
in British Columbia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002); D. C.
Harris, Land, Fish, and Law: The Legal Geography of Indian Reserves and Native
Fisheries in British Columbia, 1850-1927 (PhD Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University, 2004).
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW
expulsion of individuals who occupied unceded Indigenous lands — was
no longer practicable on a large scale. Given this new reality, the
common law did not remain idle but adapted to take account of the
change in circumstances. The adaptation was shaped by three needs: to
ensure the continuity of aboriginal title and its recognition in a modern
form; to supply appropriate remedies for the wrongs visited on
Indigenous peoples; and to accommodate public and private interests in
the lands concerned. These needs gave rise to common law Principles of
Reconciliation, which supplemented and modified the traditional
Principles of Recognition applying at the time of Crown sovereignty.
The emergence of Principles of Reconciliation was governed by the
overarching principle of the honour of the Crown. As McLachlin C.J.C.
emphasized in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Haida
Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), the honour of the
Crown is always at stake in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples.14 The
principle is not a “mere incantation,” but rather a “core precept” that
finds its application in concrete practices:
The historical roots of the principle of the honour of the Crown suggest that it must
be understood generously in order to reflect the underlying realities from which it
stems. In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of sovereignty
to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the Crown must act
honourably. Nothing less is required if we are to achieve “the reconciliation of the
pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown”...15
The most important effect of this process was to transform historical
aboriginal title from a static right to a generative right. By a generative
right, I mean a right that exists in a dynamic but latent form, which is
capable of partial articulation by the courts but whose full
implementation requires agreement between the Indigenous party and
the Crown. In effect, the courts have the power to recognize certain core
elements of a generative right — sufficient to provide the foundation for
negotiations and to ensure that the Indigenous party enjoys a significant
portion of its rights pending final agreement. However, the courts are not
in a position to give a detailed and exhaustive account of a generative
right in all its facets. This result can be achieved only by negotiations
between the parties.
More precisely, when a case involving generative aboriginal title
arises, the court may do the following:
262 [Vol.85
14 [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 at paras. 16-17 [Haida Nation].
15 Ibid. at para. 17, quoting Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para. 186, which in turn
quotes R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 31.
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(1) recognize the historical title of the claimant group as it existed at the
time of Crown sovereignty, as a baseline for modern negotiations;
(2) issue such orders as are necessary and appropriate to protect the
historical title from further erosion and invasion, while taking
account of existing private and public interests;
(3) recognize the right of the claimant group to use and possess certain
portions of its historical territory, either immediately or after the
lapse of a specified period of time;
(4) enjoin the parties to enter into negotiations aimed at defining the
modern scope of aboriginal title, as a generative right.
A court should be flexible and creative in fashioning orders designed to
achieve these ends, in keeping with its mandate to recognize and affirm
aboriginal rights, both at common law and under section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982.
This, then, is the basic thesis of this paper. The thesis has two major
branches. The first defends a certain conception of historical aboriginal
title, portraying it as a sui generis right at common law. The second
addresses the practical effects of aboriginal title today; it distinguishes
between historical title and generative title and argues that the latter is
governed by Principles of Reconciliation. The remainder of this paper
explains these two points in greater detail.
3. Conceptions of Aboriginal Title
There are three leading theories of aboriginal title. The first depicts it as
a customary right rooted in the law and practice of particular Indigenous
groups. The second views it as a translated right expressed in the
categories of English property law. The third portrays it as a sui generis
right grounded in ancient relations between the Crown and Indigenous
peoples. I will review each of these conceptions, assessing their relative
strengths and weaknesses.
A. Aboriginal Title as a Customary Right Rooted in Indigenous Law
This theory holds that aboriginal title arises from the customary legal
systems of particular Indigenous groups. Because these legal systems
differ from group to group, the character of aboriginal title also differs
accordingly. There is no uniform “aboriginal title” as such. Aboriginal
title is what may be called a specific right, rooted in the customary law
2632006]
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of each particular Indigenous group, as opposed to a generic right, whose
character does not change from one Indigenous group to another.16
This conception of aboriginal title was adopted by Brennan J. of the
High Court of Australia in Mabo v. Queensland,17 where he said:
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws
acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the indigenous
inhabitants of a territory. The nature and incidents of native title must be ascertained
as a matter of fact by reference to those laws and customs.
According to this approach, aboriginal title comes in many different
shapes and sizes, as many as there are Indigenous legal systems. Each
Indigenous group has its own kind of aboriginal title, which may bear
little resemblance to the title of other groups. To determine the character
of a group’s aboriginal title requires a detailed study of its land system
under customary law.
It may be noted that this approach lends itself to the view that
aboriginal title is the sum of a series of particular rights in relation to
land, rights that correspond to the particular uses made by a group — the
right to trap beavers, to gather blueberries, to mine copper deposits, and
so on. By the same token, it allows for the dismembering of aboriginal
title into its several parts, so that, for example, the right to hunt polar
bears or the right to fish for salmon can be isolated from the other
components of aboriginal title and viewed as a free-standing right. The
problem here is to determine the level of abstraction at which these
several rights should be stated. Does the right to hunt exist at large, or is
it limited to certain species and times of the year? Is the right to exploit
mineral deposits general in nature, or is it confined to particular
substances, such as copper?
The strength of the customary conception of aboriginal title lies in its
emphasis on the Indigenous origins of the right. Aboriginal title is
nothing if not grounded ultimately in the actual use and occupation of
lands by Indigenous peoples under their laws. It is the strong spiritual,
legal, and material bonds that Indigenous peoples hold with their lands
that animate aboriginal title and supply its underlying rationale.
Nevertheless, a little reflection shows that Indigenous customary
law, taken alone, is inadequate to define the character of aboriginal title.
There is the need for higher order principles to regulate the collective
264 [Vol.85
16 On this distinction, see Slattery, “Making Sense,” supra note 9 at 211-15.
17 (1992), 107 A.L.R. 1 (H.C.Aus.) at 42 [Mabo].
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aspects of aboriginal title, the interaction between the titles of different
Indigenous groups, and the relationship between aboriginal title and the
general legal system of the jurisdiction. Let us briefly consider some
examples.
a) Conflicting Indigenous Claims
What happens when two Indigenous groups have conflicting claims to
the same tract of land? Each group may be supported by its own
customary laws, which may thus fail to resolve the dispute. We need a set
of rules that rises above the laws of the contending parties and regulates
their interaction. Although these overarching rules may draw inspiration
from Indigenous legal systems, they are logically distinct from those
systems and necessarily reflect a broader range of considerations.
b) Conflicting Claims between an Indigenous Group and a Private
Party
A similar problem arises where an Indigenous group claims title to lands
occupied by a private party holding a Crown grant. Under Indigenous
law the claimant group may hold clear title, while under the general legal
system the private party may be entitled to possession. Here again,
higher order principles are needed to resolve the dispute. We might, of
course, hold that Indigenous law should take precedence over the general
law, or conversely that the general law should trump Indigenous law.
However, even on this simple “choice of law” approach, we need a
higher order rule to tell us which body of law should prevail.
c) The Crown’s Relationship to Indigenous Lands
What rights, if any, does the Crown hold in lands covered by aboriginal
title? This question cannot be answered simply by reference to
Indigenous legal systems, which traditionally did not have a concept of
the “Crown.” Neither can it be answered simply by reference to English
property law, which did not have a concept of “aboriginal title.” Once
again, overarching principles are needed to define the Crown’s
relationship to Indigenous lands. These principles will be governed by
considerations that transcend the scope of purely Indigenous and English
legal traditions, even if they may draw on these traditions.
d) Transfers of Indigenous Lands
May an Indigenous group sell or lease its lands to private parties outside
2652006]
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the group?18 Which body of law determines the validity and effects of the
transaction — the law of the Indigenous group or the law of the larger
community? At a minimum, we need a conflictual rule to sort the matter
out. However, a “choice of law” approach may not be sufficient here,
because neither Indigenous law nor the general legal system may have
rules that are well-adapted to the new situation. A special or sui generis
rule may be needed to deal with it. Indeed, the history of relations
between the Crown and Indigenous American peoples suggests that land
transfers were governed by a distinctive body of law which incorporated
elements of both Indigenous and English traditions and was moulded by
considerations arising from the inter-societal context.
e) The Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title
Under what circumstances does aboriginal title cease to exist? While it is
possible to argue that the answer depends on the customary laws of each
specific Indigenous group, this approach ignores the problems arising
from the multiplicity of Indigenous legal systems and the varying
solutions they offer, and it underestimates the strength of the policy
considerations favouring a uniform answer to the question.
It is interesting to note that, while Brennan J. in the Mabo case
maintains that aboriginal title is grounded in the particular laws of
Indigenous groups, he departs from this approach in dealing with the
question of extinguishment, and holds that the matter is governed by a
uniform rule that evidently owes little if anything to the laws of the
Indigenous groups concerned.19
f) The Collective Title of the Indigenous Group as a Whole
What rights does an Indigenous group as a collective entity hold in the
lands used and occupied by its members? According to the Mabo
approach, the answer is supplied by the customary law of the specific
Indigenous group in question, so that there will be as many forms of
collective title as there are groups. What happens, however, when the
customary law of a certain group does not attribute any collective title to
the group as such but only recognizes the rights of particular individuals,
families and lineages within the group? Does the law still attribute a
collective title to the group as a whole? If so, where does the relevant law
come from?
266 [Vol.85
18 This was, of course, the question confronted by the United States Supreme
Court in the landmark case of Johnson, supra note 3. For discussion, see Slattery,
Ancestral Lands, supra note 3 at 17-38.
19 Mabo, supra note 17 at 46-52.
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These questions suggest the need to distinguish between the internal
and external aspects of aboriginal title. Consider a parallel drawn from
the international sphere. As noted earlier, the external sovereignty of an
independent political entity is governed by uniform rules laid down by
international law, which assigns to all such entities the same basic range
of rights. Nevertheless the form that sovereignty takes internally differs
from entity to entity, depending on their domestic constitutions.
Similarly, it may be argued that the external aspects of aboriginal title are
governed by uniform rules supplied by an overarching body of law. This
body of law attributes a collective title to an Indigenous group as a
whole, even if the group’s internal legal system does not conceive of
such a title, and even if it does not have any notion of “title” as such.
g) Summary
This survey suggests that aboriginal title is a more complex subject than
we might think at first blush. Once we reflect on the external and
collective dimensions of aboriginal title, we see the need for a body of
uniform rules governing these matters. In other words, viewed externally,
aboriginal title must be a generic right rather than a specific right, and
the generic features of that right must be governed by a body of law that
transcends the internal legal systems of Indigenous groups, even if the
way in which aboriginal title operates within the group varies according
to the group’s particular laws. With this point in mind, let us turn to the
second conception of aboriginal title, which lies at the other end of the
theoretical spectrum.
B. Aboriginal Title as a Translated Right Held under English Common
Law
This theory maintains that aboriginal title results from the application of
standard categories of English property law to Indigenous customary
practices. In effect, it seeks to translate Indigenous occupation and
modes of land use into rights known to English law. So, for example,
where an Indigenous group occupies certain lands it may hold a fee
simple estate in those lands, if its mode of occupation is sufficient to
meet the requirements of English law.20 This estate is held of the Crown
and gives the group the full benefit of the land and the right to transfer it.
Presumably, if Indigenous occupation is not sufficient to establish the
existence of a fee simple, it might give rise to some other right known to
English property law, such as a profit à prendre — the right to use and
derive profits from land belonging to another.
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According to this conception, aboriginal land rights are not specific
rights shaped by the customary laws of particular Indigenous groups, as
the first theory argues. Rather they are generic rights known to English
property law — a fee simple, a profit à prendre, an easement, and so on.
The rights are generic in the sense that they have certain pre-established
attributes which apply across the board, regardless of the laws of the
Indigenous groups in question.
In one respect, the translation theory has an apparent advantage over
the customary approach. All the questions raised in the last section
concerning the collective and external aspects of aboriginal title are
answerable by reference to the standard rules of English property law.
So, for example, if aboriginal title is portrayed as a fee simple estate, we
know whether or not it is transferable, what rights the Crown holds in
relation to it, how it is extinguished, and so on. Whether the answers
given by English law are sensible and appropriate to the situation of
Indigenous peoples is another matter.
Indeed, this last consideration indicates one of the main weaknesses
of this approach. There is the danger that, in translating Indigenous
practices into English legal categories, something important will be lost
in translation. English property law is an intricate and artificial system,
which evolved in a particular historical context and reflects distinctive
social values, arrangements, and institutions. In applying English rules,
courts may unconsciously misconstrue and devalue the outlook and
practices of Indigenous societies, especially those whose modes of life
are foreign to European agricultural economies and involve seasonal
hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering.21 At the extreme, this approach
may lead courts to favour European over Indigenous perspectives,
forcing Indigenous practices into the procrustean bed of English legal
categories and rejecting modes of use and occupation that do not “fit.”
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The translation theory also has difficulty explaining the survival of
Indigenous legal systems and their relationship to English property law.
Either the theory assumes that Indigenous laws have been largely
superseded by English law in this sphere, or it envisages that such laws
survive as some sort of “local custom,” whose interaction with English
law is unclear and problematic. In effect, the theory must either discount
the existence of Indigenous law or try to squeeze it into cracks in the
edifice of English law.
Further problems arise from the approach’s indifference to history,
its failure to take account of the extensive land dealings between the
Crown and Indigenous American peoples from earliest colonial times.
This vast body of historical practice supports a conception of aboriginal
title that does not sit well with the categories of English property law. It
suggests, for example, that aboriginal title could not be transferred freely
to private parties but could only be ceded to or shared with the Crown
under a treaty to which the members of the Indigenous group gave their
free assent.22 This conception is at odds with English property law,
which views fee simple title as freely alienable.
Finally, it may be noted that this approach works best in jurisdictions
where English property law has been received. It is unclear how it
operates in places where another legal system prevails, such as the
province of Quebec, where the field of private law is governed by the
Civil Code, whose roots lie in the old French law imported into the
colony of New France. Presumably, under the translation theory,
aboriginal land rights in Quebec must be converted into the categories of
civil law or else fail to gain recognition.
For all these reasons, then, the translation theory seems an
unsatisfactory alternative to the custom-based approach. While it gains a
measure of uniformity and certainty, it does so at the cost of diversity and
flexibility; just as the custom-based approach secures flexibility by
sacrificing uniformity and clarity. What we need is a theory that
maintains a balance between these competing values. With that point in
mind, let us turn to the third approach.
C. Aboriginal Title as a Sui Generis Right at Common Law
As seen above, this theory maintains that aboriginal title is based, not on
English law or Indigenous law, but on a distinctive body of common law
that developed from relations between the British Crown and Indigenous
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American peoples in the early centuries of colonization.23 To recap
briefly, this body of inter-societal law was absorbed into the system of
colonial law that applied automatically to a British possession upon
acquisition, regardless whether the local legal system was based on
Indigenous law, English law, French law, or some other law. From its
customary origins in colonial North America, the common law of
aboriginal title migrated to other British colonies with Indigenous
populations.
According to this theory, aboriginal title is not grounded in English
property law, nor is it based on the customary laws of particular
Indigenous groups. It is a distinctive form of title — a sui generis right
— that gives an Indigenous group the exclusive right to possess and use
its traditional lands for such purposes as it sees fit, subject to the
restriction that the lands cannot be transferred to outsiders but may only
be ceded to or shared with the Crown, which holds an underlying title to
the land.
Viewed externally, aboriginal title is a uniform right, which does not
differ from group to group. Viewed internally, it delimits a sphere within
which the customary legal system of each group continues to operate,
regulating the manner in which the lands are used by group members and
evolving to take account of new needs and circumstances. In this respect,
the sui generis conception of aboriginal title represents a blend of the
diversity envisaged by the custom-based conception and the uniformity
contemplated by the English-based conception. It argues that aboriginal
title is a generic right in its collective and external aspects, but that it
blossoms internally into a variety of specific forms, as determined by the
customary laws of each Indigenous group.
In effect, this approach does not attempt to describe the detailed
features of Indigenous land regimes, much less to translate them into
categories of English law. Rather, it preserves for Indigenous peoples a
sphere of autonomy, within which customary land laws are free to evolve
and adapt. By the same token, the sui generis theory does not view
aboriginal title as simply the sum of a series of particular rights, or
contemplate the dismemberment of aboriginal title into a series of such
rights. It views aboriginal title as an indivisible whole — an external
framework or superstructure enclosing a sphere within which an
Indigenous land regime may operate.
For all these reasons, I suggest that the sui generis conception of
aboriginal title is the most balanced and appropriate of the theories
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considered here. Indeed, as we will now see, its virtues have not gone
unrecognized in the courts.
4. Judicial Adoption of the Sui Generis Theory
The sui generis theory has a lengthy judicial pedigree, which extends
back to the celebrated trilogy of Johnson v. M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia, decided by the United States
Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century.24 The majority opinions
in these cases were written by the Chief Justice, John Marshall, a jurist
who was steeped in American colonial history and familiar with the
question of Indian title.25 While the decisions differ somewhat in
emphasis and approach, they share a common conceptual framework.
Marshall C.J. argues that aboriginal rights emerged from the
complex historical process whereby the Crown, its agents, and grantees
gained sovereignty over Indian nations. This process varied greatly in
character, sometimes proceeding gradually, through attrition and
accommodation, sometimes more rapidly, through armed conflict or
treaties. One way or the other, says the Chief Justice, Indian peoples
ultimately assumed the status of domestic nations living under the
Crown’s protection.
He states, in a famous passage, that the Indian nations had always
been viewed as “distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from
time immemorial,” subject only to a restriction on relations 
with other European states.26 He asserts that history furnishes no
example, from the time of the first British settlements, of any attempt by
the Crown to interfere in the internal affairs of the Indians, except to keep
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out agents of foreign powers.27 The King purchased the alliance and
dependence of the Indians by subsidies, “but never intruded into the
interior of their affairs, or interfered with their self-government, so far as
respected themselves only.”28 Nevertheless, the typical Indigenous group
in contact with the British eventually became dependent on the Crown
for the supply of necessary goods and for protection from lawless
intrusions into its country.29 These and other factors operated so as to
bind that nation to the Crown as “a dependent ally, claiming the
protection of a powerful friend and neighbour, and receiving the
advantages of that protection, without involving a surrender of their
national character.”30
Nevertheless, by the early nineteenth century, Indigenous peoples
within the United States had reached the point where they could be
described as “domestic dependent nations.”31 While retaining their
internal autonomy, they were considered as being “so completely under
the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt [by
external powers] to acquire their lands, or to form a political connection
with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and
an act of hostility.”32 So, even after Indian nations had passed under the
Crown’s sovereignty they retained the right of internal self-government.
That right did not originate in a grant from the Crown. It stemmed from
the corporate status of Indian nations as autonomous entities, retaining a
portion of the rights they had enjoyed when they were fully independent.
In effect, the right of self-government was an inherent right rather than
one granted by the Crown.
In the Chief Justice’s view, the aboriginal right of self-government
recognized by the United States was based on the right previously
acknowledged by the British Crown in its relations with Indian nations
under its protection. While the right assumed a particular character under
the United States Constitution, many of its basic features were inherited
from the British colonial era. As Marshall C.J. puts the matter:
Such was the policy of Great Britain towards the Indian nations inhabiting the
territory from which she excluded all other Europeans; such her claims, and such her
practical exposition of the charters she had granted: she considered them as nations
capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war; of governing themselves,
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under her protection; and she made treaties with them, the obligation of which she
acknowledged.33
The Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty brought with it what
Marshall C.J. describes as a “complete ultimate title” to the soil, subject
to an Indian “right of possession” that the Crown alone could acquire.34
The Crown’s title stemmed originally from the so-called principle of
discovery, which held good only against other European states. It was a
principle that regulated competition among the imperial powers that had
agreed to it, not one that could affect the rights of the Indigenous
occupants, who had not agreed to it. So long as the Crown’s title existed
merely in theory, as an incident of the principle of discovery, it remained
dormant as regards the Indigenous peoples. However, once the Indian
nations became subject to the Crown’s factual authority, the title became
operative against them.35 The Crown’s ultimate title coexisted with the
Indigenous peoples’ right of possession, which was a legal right,
recognizable in the courts, and not dependent merely on policy or
considerations of justice.
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as
just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion;
but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle that discovery gave
exclusive title to those who made it.36
In effect, then, Indigenous peoples have a right of occupancy which
burdens the ultimate title of the Crown and gives them full beneficial use
of the land — the right “to use it according to their own discretion.”
However, their power to dispose of the land freely is now confined to a
right of alienation to the Crown. Aboriginal title is a collective title that
vests in the nation as a whole. In its external and collective aspects it has
a uniform character, which does not vary from one Indigenous group to
another. However, within the group, its operation is governed by the
specific laws of each group. Hence a person who purchases lands from
the Indians within their territory holds his title under their protection and
subject to their laws.37
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The Marshall decisions proved highly influential in Canadian courts,
where they were taken as a template for the view that Indian title was an
inalienable “usufructuary right” which burdened the ultimate title of the
Crown. This viewpoint was elaborated by Strong J. of the Supreme Court
of Canada in the St. Catharines Milling & Lumber Co. case.38 Although
Strong J. dissented in the result in that case, his opinion has often been
cited as a classic exposition of the subject.
Strong J. begins by summarizing Marshall C.J.’s account of British
policy in the American colonies:
It may be summarily stated as consisting in the recognition by the crown of a
usufructuary title in the Indians to all unsurrendered lands. This title, though not
perhaps susceptible of any accurate legal definition in exact legal terms, was one
which nevertheless sufficed to protect the Indians in the absolute use and enjoyment
of their lands, whilst at the same time they were incapacitated from making any
valid alienation otherwise than to the crown itself, in whom the ultimate title was, in
accordance with the English law of real property, considered as vested.39
Strong J. points out that the American authorities traced this doctrine
to the era prior to the American Revolution, viewing it as a continuation
of the principles of law or policy originally established by the British
government in its American colonies and therefore identical to those that
have continued to be recognized in British North America.40 This
traditional policy, derived from colonial times, has ripened in the United
States into well-established rules of law, with the result that lands in the
possession of the Indians are, until surrendered, treated as their rightful
though inalienable property so far as possession and enjoyment are
concerned. In other words, the dominium utile is recognized as belonging
to the Indians though the dominium directum is considered to be in the
United States.41
If this is true of Indian lands in the United States, asks Strong J., is it
possible to suppose that the law is less favourable to the Indians in the
dominions of the British Crown, the original author of the doctrine? In
Canada the uniform practice has always been to recognize the Indian title
as one that could only be dealt with by surrender to the Crown. Even if
there were no legislation ordaining this rule, we ought to hold that it
exists as a rule of the unwritten common law, which the courts are bound
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to enforce as such. The terms of the Constitution Act, 186742 must
therefore be construed on the assumption that the territorial rights of the
Indians were strictly legal rights that had to be taken into account in the
distribution of proprietary rights between the federal and provincial
governments.43
To summarize these arguments, which appear to me to possess great force, we find,
that at the date of confederation the Indians, by the constant usage and practice of
the crown, were considered to possess a certain proprietary interest in the
unsurrendered lands which they occupied as hunting grounds; that this usage had
either ripened into a rule of the common law as applicable to the American Colonies,
or that such a rule had been derived from the law of nations and had in this way been
imported into the Colonial law as applied to Indian Nations; that such property of
the Indians was usufructuary only and could not be alienated, except by surrender to
the crown as the ultimate owner of the soil ...44
Three points in this analysis merit attention. First, Strong J.
emphasizes that the origins of the doctrine of Indian title lie in principles
and practices of the British Crown in its dealings with Indigenous
American peoples in early colonial times and that these practices ripened
into “a rule of the common law as applicable to the American Colonies.”
He makes it clear that he is referring, not to English common law in the
narrow sense, but to a distinctive body of common law that emerged in
the American colonies.
Second, Strong J. contemplates that the doctrine in question became
part of “the Colonial law as applied to Indian Nations.” By “Colonial
law,” he seems to mean the body of imperial common law that applied
automatically to colonies acquired by the Crown and regulated their
basic status and constitutional structure. As argued earlier, colonial law’s
adoption of the doctrine of aboriginal title explains how the doctrine
spread beyond the area of its immediate origins and became applicable
to British colonies generally, regardless of the nature of their local legal
systems.
Finally, Strong J. describes Indian title as a “usufructuary title.” In
using this phrase, he is speaking analogically rather than literally. He has
no desire to import the technical concept of “usufruct” from Roman law
and the civil law. Rather, he has in mind the fact that Indian title, while
protecting Indians in the absolute use and enjoyment of their lands, 
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cannot be alienated except to the Crown, in whom the ultimate title is
vested.45
When the St. Catharines case was appealed to the Privy Council, the
Board adopted several features of Strong J.’s analysis.46 In a series of
terse remarks, Lord Watson characterized Indian title as a “personal and
usufructuary right” which burdened the Crown’s underlying title and
could only be sold or transferred to the Crown. However, unlike Strong
J., he seemed inclined to attribute the existence of Indian title to the
Proclamation of 1763 rather than the common law, and he stated
enigmatically that the title was “dependent upon the good will of the
Sovereign.”47
Further clarity had to await the Privy Council’s decision in Amodu
Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Nigeria.48 In an illuminating judgment,
Viscount Haldane warns of the need for caution in interpreting native
title to land, not only in Southern Nigeria (where the case arose) but also
in other parts of the British Empire. There is the tendency, he notes, to
conceptualize native title in terms appropriate only to English legal
systems. But this tendency has to be held closely in check. As a rule, in
the various systems of native jurisprudence throughout the Empire, there
is no such full division between property and possession as found in
English law. A very usual form of native title is that of a “usufructuary
right,” which is a burden on the radical title of the Sovereign where that
exists. In such cases the title of the Sovereign is a pure legal estate, to
which beneficial rights may or may not be attached. But this estate is
qualified by a right of beneficial user which may not assume definite
forms analogous to estates. He remarks that the Privy Council has
elsewhere explained principles of this kind in connection with the Indian
title to reserve lands in Canada, and he refers to the St. Catherine’s
case.49
Viscount Haldane notes that there is another fundamental feature of
native title to land that has to be borne in mind. The title may not be that
of an individual, as is usual in England, but may be that of a community:
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Such a community may have the possessory title to the common enjoyment of a
usufruct, with customs under which its individual members are admitted to
enjoyment, and even to a right of transmitting the individual enjoyment as members
by assignment inter vivos or by succession. To ascertain how far this latter
development of right has progressed involves the study of the history of the
particular community and its usages in each case. Abstract principles fashioned a
priori are of but little assistance, and are as often as not misleading.50
His Lordship distinguishes here between native title proper, which
consists of a communal usufructuary right, and the internal operation of
that title, which is governed by the internal customs of the community
and so differs from group to group.
Viscount Haldane observes that, when the British Crown gained the
colony by cession, no doubt it acquired, along with the sovereignty, the
radical or ultimate title to the land. But the cession appears to have been
made on the footing that the property rights of the inhabitants were to be
fully respected. He notes that this principle is a usual one under British
policy and law when such occupations take place. The general words of
the cession are construed as relating primarily to sovereign rights rather
than property.51 He concludes that the courts below failed to recognise
the real character of the title to land occupied by a native community.
Prima facie, that title is based, not on individual ownership as in English
law, but on a communal usufructuary occupation, which may be so
complete as to reduce any radical right in the Sovereign to comparatively
limited rights of administrative interference.52
The Amodu Tijani case has the virtue of placing the St. Catharines
decision in the broader context of the British Empire as a whole. It clarifies
the relationship between the concept of native title as such, which consists
of a communal usufructuary title that co-exists with the ultimate title of the
Crown, and the internal operation of that title, which is governed by the
customary law of the Indigenous group in question. The decision portrays
native title as a distinctive form of title that presumptively survives the
Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and does not depend on an explicit act
of recognition by the Crown.
In sum, these cases steer a middle course between the view that
aboriginal title is a right grounded exclusively in Indigenous custom, and
the opposing view that it is a translated right held under English property
law. They portray aboriginal title as a generic collective right at common
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law that allows for the continued operation of customary law within the
group — what we have called the sui generis conception of aboriginal
title.
5. Modern Canadian Jurisprudence
These classic judgments have served as anchor and ballast for the modern
Canadian case law on aboriginal title. They were quoted extensively in the
watershed decision of the Supreme Court in the Calder case,53 where they
featured in the opinions of both Judson J. and Hall J. The same stream of
jurisprudence was tapped by Dickson J. in the later Guerin case,54 where
he characterized aboriginal title as a sui generis right that cannot be
described appropriately in terminology drawn from general property law.
He held that aboriginal title gives Indigenous peoples the legal right to
possess their traditional lands and that the right is inalienable except to the
Crown, which holds the ultimate title.
The distinctive nature of aboriginal title was underlined in the
Delgamuukw decision, now the leading authority on the subject.55 In his
wide-ranging discussion, Lamer C.J.C. explains that aboriginal rights stem
from the reconciliation of prior Indigenous occupation with the Crown’s
assertion of sovereignty. Reconciliation is achieved by building a bridge
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous cultures, which gives rise to
common law rights that are truly sui generis.56 In line with this approach,
the Chief Justice rejects the appellants’ argument that aboriginal title is
tantamount to an inalienable fee simple. He likewise dismisses the
respondents’ contention that it is no more than a bundle of rights to engage
in a variety of specific traditional practices. Rather, he holds that
aboriginal title is a sui generis right that gives Indigenous peoples the right
to use the land for a broad range of purposes. These purposes need not be
aspects of traditional customs and practices, so long as they are not
irreconcilable with the nature of the group’s basic attachment to the land.57
Lamer C.J.C. comments that the phrase “personal and usufructuary
right” used by the Privy Council in the St. Catherine’s case is not
particularly helpful:
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What the Privy Council sought to capture is that aboriginal title is a sui generis
interest in land. Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in order to
distinguish it from “normal” proprietary interests, such as fee simple. However, as I
will now develop, it is also sui generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot be
explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the rules
of property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it must
be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal perspectives.58
The sui generis character of aboriginal title, explains the Chief Justice, is
manifested in three distinctive features: it cannot be transferred to
anyone other than the Crown; it stems from the occupation of land prior
to the assertion of British sovereignty; and it is a collective right held by
all members of an Indigenous nation and governed by communal
decisions.59
In summary, the Delgamuukw case stands for the proposition that
aboriginal title is a collective title that bridges the divide between
European-derived land systems and Indigenous land systems. Viewed
externally, aboriginal title is a generic right which possesses certain
distinctive features, such as inalienability, that do not change from one
Indigenous group to another. Viewed internally, aboriginal title allows
each Indigenous group to use its lands in its own fashion, within certain
broad limits. In taking this approach, Delgamuukw anchors its reasoning
in the sui generis theory expounded in the classic cases.
6. The Marshall/Bernard Decision
This long line of jurisprudence, extending over nearly two centuries,
serves as a ringing endorsement of the sui generis concept of aboriginal
title. It is surprising, then, to find the Supreme Court of Canada
apparently favouring a different approach in the recent Marshall/Bernard
decision60 — one that portrays aboriginal title as a translated right held
under English common law. In a puzzling judgment, McLachlin C.J.C.
sets out the following approach to aboriginal title:
The Court’s task in evaluating a claim for an aboriginal right is to examine the pre-
sovereignty aboriginal practice and translate that practice, as faithfully and
objectively as it can, into a modern legal right. The question is whether the
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aboriginal practice at the time of assertion of European sovereignty (not, unlike
treaties, when a document was signed) translates into a modern legal right, and if so,
what right? This exercise involves both aboriginal and European perspectives. The
Court must consider the pre-sovereignty practice from the perspective of the
aboriginal people. But in translating it to a common law right, the Court must also
consider the European perspective; the nature of the right at common law must be
examined to determine whether a particular aboriginal practice fits it. This exercise
in translating aboriginal practices to modern rights must not be conducted in a
formalistic or narrow way. The Court should take a generous view of the aboriginal
practice and should not insist on exact conformity to the precise legal parameters of
the common law right. The question is whether the practice corresponds to the core
concepts of the legal right claimed.61
According to this passage, the judicial task is one of translation. The
court has the job of converting historical Indigenous practices into
modern rights under the common law. By “common law,” the Chief
Justice appears to mean English common law. She associates the
common law with the “European perspective,”62 and elsewhere she says
that “both aboriginal and European common law perspectives must be
considered.”63 Here the term “European” seems to be a proxy for
“English,” for there is, of course, no such thing as European common
law. The common law is confined to England — the rest of Europe being
governed by civil law systems.
The overall effect of this approach is apparently to endorse the view
that aboriginal title is a translated right held under modern English
common law – which is the second theory considered earlier. This
approach has a number of problems. First, as we have seen, aboriginal
title is not a modern right. It is an ancient form of title, grounded in
colonial practice dating back to the 1600s, recognized in the
Proclamation of 1763, and extensively analysed in court decisions from
the early nineteenth century onwards. To treat it as the product of modern
judicial activity is to turn one’s back on several centuries of legal history.
Second, although aboriginal title is a common law right, there is little in
the jurisprudence to suggest that it is a right held under English common
law, much less European common law, whatever that might be. Finally,
aboriginal title does not result from the translation of Indigenous
customary practices into non-Indigenous legal categories. Rather,
aboriginal title is a distinctive inter-societal right that bridges the gap
between Indigenous and European-based land systems and regulates
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62 Ibid. [emphasis added].
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their interaction. No translation is needed.
It is hard to know what to make of the Supreme Court’s approach in
Marshall/Bernard. Superficially, at least, it represents a sharp departure
from the sui generis approach previously endorsed by the Court.
Whether the Chief Justice truly intends to reverse the existing course of
jurisprudence is open to question – there is no evidence of such a radical
intent in her judgment. The Chief Justice’s main concern — and a proper
one at that — is to bring about the reconciliation between historical
aboriginal rights and modern rights held under general Canadian law.
This concern comes to the fore in the following passage:
In summary, the court must examine the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice and
translate that practice into a modern right. The process begins by examining the
nature and extent of the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice in question. It goes on
to seek a corresponding common law right. In this way the process determines the
nature and extent of the modern right and reconciles the aboriginal and European
perspectives.
The second underlying concept — the range of aboriginal rights — flows from the
process of reconciliation just described. Taking the aboriginal perspective into
account does not mean that a particular right, like title to the land, is established. The
question is what modern right best corresponds to the pre-sovereignty aboriginal
practice, examined from the aboriginal perspective.64
McLachlin C.J.C. rightly emphasizes that reconciliation is the main
goal of the modern law of aboriginal rights. Where she goes astray is in
assuming that this can be achieved by a process of translation. In reality,
such a process artificially constrains and distorts the true character of
aboriginal title and risks compounding the historical injustices visited on
Indigenous peoples. Far from reconciling Indigenous peoples with the
Crown, it seems likely to exacerbate existing conflicts and grievances. 
How, then, can reconciliation best be achieved? I suggest that the
path forward lies in distinguishing between Principles of Recognition
and Principles of Reconciliation. This is the subject of our next section.
7. Principles of Recognition and Reconciliation
As seen earlier, Principles of Recognition govern the nature and scope of
aboriginal title at the time of Crown sovereignty — what we have called
historical title. This title provides the point of departure for any modern
inquiry and a benchmark for assessing the actions of colonial
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governments and the scope of Indigenous dispossession. By contrast,
Principles of Reconciliation govern the legal effects of aboriginal title in
modern times. They take as their starting point the historical title of the
Indigenous group, as determined by Principles of Recognition, but they
also take into account a range of other factors, such as the subsequent
history of the lands in question, the Indigenous group’s contemporary
interests, and the interests of third parties and the larger society. So
doing, they posit that historical aboriginal title has been transformed into
a generative right, which can be partially implemented by the courts but
whose full implementation requires the negotiation of modern treaties.
Unless we distinguish between these two sets of principles, we may
fall into the trap of assuming that historical aboriginal title gives rise
automatically to modern title, without regard to its broader social impact.
Such an assumption fosters two judicial tendencies. The courts may be
led to construe historical aboriginal title in an artificially restrictive way,
in the effort to minimize conflicts with modern societal and third party
interests. Alternately, an expansive view may be taken of the processes
whereby historical title is extinguished, whether by Crown action or the
passage of time. These tendencies, if left to operate unchecked, will
diminish the possibility of reconciliation ever occurring. For the
successful settlement of aboriginal claims must involve the full and
unstinting recognition of the historical reality of aboriginal title, the true
scope and effects of Indigenous dispossession, and the continuing links
between an Indigenous people and its traditional lands. So, for example,
to maintain that “nomadic” or “semi-nomadic” peoples had historical
aboriginal title to only a fraction of their ancestral hunting territories,65
or to hold that aboriginal title could be extinguished simply by Crown
grant,66 is to rub salt into open wounds. However, by the same token, the
recognition of historical title, while a necessary precondition for modern
reconciliation, is not in itself a sufficient basis for reconciliation, which
must take into account a range of other factors. So, for example, to
suggest that historical aboriginal title gives rise to modern rights that
automatically trump third party and public interests constitutes an
attempt to remedy one grave injustice by committing another.
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65 See McLachlin C.J.C.’s apparent suggestion that seasonal hunting, fishing, and
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issue is considered in B. J. Burke, “Left Out in the Cold: The Problem with Aboriginal
Title Under Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 for Historically Nomadic
Aboriginal Peoples” (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
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The point is nicely captured in a passage in the Mikisew case,67
where Binnie J. states:
The fundamental objective of the modern law of aboriginal and treaty rights is the
reconciliation of aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and their respective
claims, interests and ambitions. The management of these relationships takes place
in the shadow of a long history of grievances and misunderstanding.
As Binnie J. notes, the process of reconciliation requires the courts to
take account of the claims and interests of both aboriginal and non-
aboriginal peoples. But the process is overshadowed by historical
grievances that cannot be minimized or glossed over. In effect,
reconciliation must strike a balance between the need to remedy past
injustices and the need to accommodate contemporary interests. On the
one hand, unless the modern law provides appropriate standards (in the
form of Principles of Recognition) for understanding the true nature and
scope of historical aboriginal rights, there can be no proper basis for
modern reconciliation. On the other hand, if historical rights are taken to
give rise to modern rights tout court, without any regard to their impact
on present-day society, the cause of reconciliation will be equally ill-
served.
Let me attempt a preliminary sketch of the twin sets of Principles of
Recognition and Reconciliation, while emphasizing the need for further
elaboration in the context of actual cases. I suggest that Principles of
Recognition should have the following basic characteristics:
(1) They should acknowledge the historical reality that “when the
settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and
occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries,”
as Judson J. observed in the Calder case.68 They should not draw
arbitrary distinctions between “settled,” “nomadic,” and “semi-
nomadic” peoples but accept that all of the Indigenous peoples
in Canada had historical rights to their ancestral homelands —
the lands from which they drew their material livelihood, social
identity, and spiritual nourishment — regardless whether they
had developed conceptions of “ownership,” “property,” or
“exclusivity,” and without forcing their practices into conceptual
boxes derived from English or French law.
(2) They should take account of the long history of relations
between Indigenous peoples and the British Crown, and the
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body of inter-societal law that emerged from those relations.
(3) They should draw inspiration from fundamental principles of
international law and justice, principles that are truly universal,
and not grounded simply in rules that European imperial powers
formulated to suit their own convenience, such as the supposed
“principle of discovery.”69
(4) They should envisage the continuing operation of customary law
within the Indigenous group concerned. At the same time, they
should explain the way in which the collective title of an
Indigenous group relates to the titles of other Indigenous groups
and to rights held under the general land system. 
As argued earlier, the conception of historical aboriginal title that best
satisfies these criteria is the sui generis theory, which holds that
aboriginal title is a distinctive common law right grounded in inter-
societal relations between Indigenous peoples and the Crown in the early
centuries of colonization.
Turning now to Principles of Reconciliation, I suggest they should
have the following basic features:
(1) They should acknowledge the historical rights of Indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands under Principles of Recognition,
as the essential starting point for any modern settlement.
(2) They should explain how historical aboriginal rights were
transformed into generative rights with the passage of time and
the rise of third party and other societal interests.
(3) They should draw a distinction in principle between the “inner
core” of generative aboriginal rights that may be implemented
without negotiation in modern times, and a “penumbra” or
“outer layer” that needs to be articulated in treaties concluded
between the Indigenous people and the Crown.70
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Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para. 136, and further discussion in Slattery, “Making
Sense”, supra note 9 at 198-206.
70 For the distinction between an inner core and a negotiated penumbra as applied
to aboriginal governmental rights, see Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government, and the Constitution
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993) at 36-48; Canada, Report of
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 
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(4) They should provide guidelines governing the accommodation
of rights and interests held by third parties within the historical
territories of Indigenous peoples. 
(5) They should create strong incentives for negotiated settlements
to be reached within a reasonable period of time.71
While it may seem a tall order to identify principles that fulfill these
sets of criteria, I think that, given time and a little imagination, it is
hardly beyond the capacities of the courts. Indeed, the constitutional
basis for doing so has already been identified by the Supreme Court of
Canada in the path-breaking decisions in Haida Nation72 and Taku River
Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director),73
which mark the emergence of a new constitutional paradigm governing
aboriginal rights.74 This paradigm views section 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982 as the basis of a generative constitutional order — one that
mandates the Crown to negotiate with Indigenous peoples for the
recognition of their rights in a form that balances their contemporary
needs and interests with the needs and interests of the broader society.
According to this approach, when the Crown claimed sovereignty
over Canadian territories and ultimately gained factual control over
them, it did so in the face of pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty and
territorial rights. The tension between these conflicting claims gave rise
to a special relationship that requires the Crown to deal honourably with
Indigenous peoples. The fundamental principle of the “honour of the
Crown” obliges the Crown to respect aboriginal rights, which in turn
requires it to negotiate with Indigenous peoples with a view to
identifying those rights. It also obliges the Crown to consult with
Indigenous peoples in all cases where its activities affect their asserted
1996), Vol. 2 at 213-24.
71 For helpful discussion, see S. Lawrence & P. Macklem, “From Consultation to
Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights and the Crown’s Duty to Consult” (2000) 79 Can.
Bar Rev. 252 esp. at 270-72; S. Imai, “Sound Science, Careful Policy Analysis, and
Ongoing Relationships: Integrating Litigation and Negotiation in Aboriginal Lands and
Resources Disputes” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 587; S. Imai, “Creating
Disincentives to Negotiate: Mitchell v. M.N.R.’s Potential Effect on Dispute
Resolution” (2003) 22 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 309.
72 Supra note 14. 
73 [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 [Taku River]. 
74 For fuller discussion, see B. Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the
Crown” (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L Rev. 433, from which this account is drawn.
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rights and, where appropriate, to accommodate these rights by adjusting
the activities.75 McLachlin C.J.C. sums up the matter as follows: 
Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and were
never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims with the sovereignty of the
Crown through negotiated treaties. Others, notably in British Columbia, have yet to
do so. The potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be
determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. While this process continues,
the honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where indicated,
accommodate Aboriginal interests.76
The Chief Justice emphasizes that the Crown has the duty to achieve
a just settlement of aboriginal claims by negotiation and treaty. So doing,
she attributes a generative role to section 35. In effect, she holds that the
Crown, with judicial assistance, has the duty to foster a new legal order
for aboriginal rights, through negotiation and agreement with the
Indigenous peoples affected. This approach views section 35 as serving
a dynamic function — one that does not come to an end even when
treaties are successfully concluded. As McLachlin C.J.C. states:
The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to consult and
accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins with
the assertion of sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims resolution.
Reconciliation is not a final legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather, it is a process
flowing from rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.77
In other words, section 35 does not simply recognize a static body of
aboriginal rights, whose contours may be ascertained by the application
of general legal criteria to historical circumstances — what we have
called historical rights. Rather, the section recognizes a body of
generative rights, which bind the Crown to take positive steps to identify
aboriginal rights in a contemporary form, with the participation and
consent of the Indigenous peoples concerned.
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77 Ibid. at para. 32 [emphasis added].
